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A B S T R A C T   
Despite the increase in regulation and codes, there is a relatively small body of scientific literature on maritime 
disasters management, especially in terms of human factors that affect the success of the evacuation and safety 
procedures. This paper provides an analysis of passengers’ behaviour during the Costa Concordia disaster of 
2012, in which 32 people died. We use 49 passengers’ witness statement made available by the court of Grosseto 
to understand how the evacuation occurred. We examine whether the main factor in reducing the effectiveness of 
the evacuation procedure was the lack of effective management or the behaviours among evacuees, or a com-
bination of the two. 
Results of the analysis suggest that passengers reacted with solidarity, helped each other and that such 
spontaneous and pro-social behaviour possibly contributed to reduce the number of casualties. By contrast, 
competitive behaviours happened only in relation to specific environmental constraints and were limited to the 
proximity of safety boats. 
The deficiencies in command in the Costa Concordia evacuation highlights the need to increase the skills of 
personnel called to manage an emergency at sea and the need to create ad hoc training programs that consider 
also unexpected scenarios. 
Understanding how people (both staff and public) deal with an emergency and the factors that affect their 
decision is pivotal to help planners to review their strategy, anticipate similar events, and consider all the factors 
in future plans and regulations. While human error is always a big factor in maritime disaster, its impact can be 
considered and mitigated with specific procedures and adaptable plans.   
1. Introduction 
Since 1980, the cruise ship industry has been one of the fastest 
growing sectors in the travel sector (Barron and Greenwood, 2006; Brida 
and Aguirre, 2008) and recent years have been characterised by a sig-
nificant increase in large-scale cruise ships and passenger ships in terms 
of numbers and popularity (Kvamme, 2017). As consequence, the 
number of maritime disasters involving passenger ships has also 
increased and maritime disasters have caused more injuries and fatal-
ities then road disasters.1 Many dramatic maritime disasters happened 
in recent years (e.g. the capsizing of the Princess of Stars in 2008). Some 
of them have been characterised by the desertion of the ship by the 
captain before the end of the evacuation process; in 2014 the captain of 
the Sewol left the ship without issuing an evacuation order, hindering 
the formal start of the evacuation (Kee et al., 2017). Most of these events 
were characterised by the captain’s inability to manage the emergency 
and by ineffective decisions; for example, during the emergency of the 
Oceanos the cruise director reported that many of the officers left the 
ship before the emergency was over, leaving the passengers without any 
information about what to do (Allen, 1994). 
The same happened during the Costa Concordia disaster which took 
place near Tuscany in 2012, when Captain Francesco Schettino 
* Corresponding author. 
E-mail address: a.bartolucci@fgga.leidenuniv.nl (A. Bartolucci).   
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abandoned the ship before the end of the evacuation resulting in one of 
the largest number of fatalities in a passenger ship accident in Europe in 
recent years and which was followed by great public interest (Elnaba-
wybahriz et al., 2016). As declared in the Judgment of the Court of First 
Instance of 11 February 2015 no. 115/2015 (Court of Grosseto, 2015), 
the abandonment of the ship resulted in a lack of management and in 
organizational improvisation (Court of Grosseto, 2015). What this and 
the other two emergencies have in common is that passengers did not 
receive help or information and were left alone, possibly causing injuries 
and fatalities (Talley et al., 2008; Lu and Yang, 2011). 
Although ship abandonment by the crew seems to be a frequent 
feature of emergency management in case of disasters involving pas-
senger ships, the way people behave in such situation is still not properly 
investigated. The literature abounds with mathematic models that 
describe efficient strategies to safely evacuate a sinking ship considering 
the ship’s architectural design (Kobes et al., 2010; Carattin et al., 2011; 
Pinto et al., 2012) or the amount of information received by passengers 
(Ockerby, 2001; Nevalainen et al., 2015). But modelling people’s 
behaviour is not always sufficient to deeply consider all the elements 
that lead a person to take a decision, especially during emergencies 
(Marmot, 2002). Analysing and describing people’s actual behaviour 
during emergencies is challenging and would ideally require collecting 
primary data (such as video or interviews) (Kvamme, 2017; Alexander, 
2012) while the emergency is still ongoing. Such challenge could be one 
possible reason of the lack of studies about how passengers react to the 
absence of command and the consequent lack of information. Secondary 
data (i.e. data not directly collected by the researcher) are a feasible 
alternative when contemporaneous primary data are not available. 
However, such information is not always easy to collect or does not 
provide enough details for a proper analysis. 
The Costa Concordia disaster offers a unique opportunity to inves-
tigate the combination of factors that affect the correct execution of the 
entire emergency procedures, because documents related to the pro-
ceedings have been made available by the Court of Grosseto, in charge of 
the trial. These documents enable us to study the evacuation, the 
communication, the crisis management and, above all, the behaviour of 
passengers during the event. Behaviour is especially important given 
that previous research has shown that in emergencies most lives are 
typically saved by “ordinary” members of the public - whether bystander 
or fellow survivors - rather than by professionals (Helsloot and Ruiten-
berg, 2004). And yet detailed comparisons of different evacuations show 
that as well as cooperation, under some circumstances there is compe-
tition and pushing among evacuees which might jeopardize their safe 
exit (Chertkoff and Kushigian, 1999). 
The present paper complements the attempt of previous researches 
to describe peoples’ behaviour during the Costa Concordia disaster 
(Kvamme, 2017; Alexander, 2012) using witnesses’ evidence collected 
during the hearings held by the Court of Grosseto. The evidence is 
treated as “indirect interviews” with survivors and the analysis pre-
sented in this paper represents one of the rare (if not only) example of 
the use of such evidence transcripts to investigate passengers’ behaviour 
during maritime disasters. It also represents the only analysis of the 
available documents related to the Costa Concordia proceedings in 
terms of passengers’ witness evidence collected during the hearings held 
by the Court of Grosseto. It provides a critical investigation of how the 
lack of the management, due to the abandonment by the captain, 
affected the behaviours of the passengers during the Costa Concordia 
disaster with a special focus on risk perception and cooperative versus 
competitive behaviour. We hypothesised that the lack of management 
by the captain and ineffective organizational improvisation by the crew 
resulted in most of the passengers spontaneously, self-organizing 
themselves and displaying both cooperative and competitive behav-
iour, instead of following all the crew’s instructions. Furthermore, we 
also hypothesised that competitive behaviours during the Costa Con-
cordia happened only in situations of physical and environmental con-
straints (e.g. when approaching and boarding the safety boats). 
The aim of this paper is therefore to investigate public behaviours 
during the Costa Concordia disaster both in terms of cooperation and 
competition in relation with the lack of management. It also aims to 
provide answers to the following research questions: How did people 
behave and react during the emergency? Are there differences in the 
behaviour towards familiar people or others? What behaviours are 
referred to by passengers with the term “panic”? Are such behaviours 
predominant throughout the entire evacuation or are they prevailing in 
specific circumstances? Did people receive conflicting information and 
how they react? Finally, the paper also aims to compare these results to 
the existing literature: Kvamme (2017), for example, looked at the 
passengers’ behaviour as a factor that reduced the effectiveness of the 
evacuation. 
1.1. The costa concordia disaster 
On 13 January 2012, the Italian cruise ship Costa Concordia hit an 
underwater rock and capsized off the coast of the Isola del Giglio, Tus-
cany, Italy. The collision occurred during the so-called “inchino” 
(salute), an unregulated but accepted manoeuvre that is usually made 
with the intent to greet and pay homage to the inhabitants of the island 
and advertise the presence of the ship on land. After the impact, the 
Costa Concordia gradually listed to the right side, leaning on the seabed 
and remaining largely above water on the left side. The accident resulted 
in 32 deaths and 193 further victims with non-fatal injuries. Table 1 
shows the timeline of the key events of the disaster according to the 
reconstruction made during the legal proceedings. 
At the beginning of the event, the captain of the Costa Concordia, 
although the extent of the damage was immediately reported from the 
outset, decided to minimize the emergency and delay the start of the 
emergency procedures; furthermore, once the order was heeded, the 
captain abandoned the ship itself jumping on the roof of a lifeboat before 
the evacuation was completely over (Court of Grosseto, 2015) going 
against the Italian Navigational Code (D.R. 30/03/1942n.327) that 
defines the captain as having a pivotal role in the management of the 
emergency (Art. 186) and requires him to coordinate all the evacuation 
procedures. According to the International Maritime Law and the IMO 
regulations (IMO, 2009), the emergency alarms have to be sounded 
when the seriousness of the situation is assessed and passengers have to 
be evacuated within 30 min after the ‘abandon ship’ order is issued. 
During the Costa Concordia capsizing, the ship abandonment order was 
decided by the captain and issued by the deputy officer an hour after the 
impact even though the captain was aware that the ship should have 
been evacuated after few minutes from the impact (Court of Grosseto, 
Table 1 
Timeline of the key events during the Costa Concordia disaster.  
TIME (CET) EVENT 
January 13th, 2012 
18:57 Cruise sets sail from port of Civitavecchia (Italy) 
21:04 Starts ‘salute’ approach to Giglio Island 
21:45 Traveling at 15 knots, ship strikes the Scola Piccola rock off Giglio 
21:45–21:55 Ship decelerates to zero knots and turns more than 180 degrees 
22:12 Passengers advised to “return to their cabin” 
22:14 Officers begin contact with Port Authority of Livorno (Italian 
mainland) 
22:25 Captain admits to Port Authority that the situation is critical and 
requests the use of a tug 
22:25–22:51 Ad hoc unofficial evacuation begins 
22:51 Captain gives instruction to heed the abandon ship order 
22:54 Staff Captain orders the abandon ship 
23:10 The official evacuation starts 
January 14th, 2012 
01:30 Captain communicates to Port Authority he left the ship 
01:45 Harbor Master of Livorno ‘orders’ Captain to return to ship (he does 
not do so) 
04:46 Evacuation officially ends 
06:17 Search and Rescue teams leave the ship  
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2015). Just after having ordered the abandonment of the ship, the 
captain of the Costa Concordia left the ship leaving his crew, partially 
unprepared to manage an emergency of this magnitude, devoid of the 
figure responsible for coordination. The Costa Concordia evacuation 
lasted for more than six hours as consequence of Schettino’s belated 
decision not to order the evacuation of the ship (Kvamme, 2017). His 
decisions created a leadership void, produced a delay on the evacuation 
procedure, and above all resulted in the inability of the crew to coor-
dinate the situation and provide accurate information to the passengers. 
The evacuation procedures that followed were managed by the 
entertainment and hospitality staff (Alexander, 2012) which resulted in 
the emergence of organizational improvisation; staff, in fact, were not 
prepared, had no adequate training and spoke different languages 
(although Italian was the work language and they were required to also 
speak English). The results were problems in communication and 
cooperation. The delay in evacuation, the lack of management by the 
staff, the lack of training and the unfamiliarity with the ship’s envi-
ronment (Casareale et al., 2017) had multiple consequences in the 
management of the event and strongly affected the passengers’ behav-
iour and the way they dealt with the emergency. 
In the immediate aftermath of the event, as reported by the Italian 
Ministry of Infrastructures and Transport (Ministry of Infrastructures 
and Transport, 2012), the first information given to the passengers by 
the Costa Concordia officials was that the problem was simply an elec-
trical fault and they reassured the passengers that it would be fixed 
immediately. Passengers were not given any communication on what to 
do and how to behave, nor were the emergency protocols activated. 
They also received contradictory information (Elnabawybahriz et al., 
2016). Passengers were informed that the best thing to do was to return 
to their cabins, but fortunately few passengers followed the instruction 
that could have led to more casualties (Alexander, 2012). As a conse-
quence of their assessment of the situation and of the lack of information 
from the staff, passengers autonomously started to evacuate the ship 
before a formal authorization was issued with many of the passengers 
independently already gathered at the assembly points which were not 
adequately supervised by the crew. Despite the reassuring message from 
the staff, passengers quickly realised that a more serious accident was 
happening, because the ship violently listed and the speed of the ship 
immediately decreased (Elnabawybahriz et al., 2016). 
1.2. People’s behaviour and risk communication 
The decision to evacuate is composed of a series of sub-decisions as 
people assess the situation and the threat, perceived the risk, and how 
they can adapt to it, adding complexity to the process of evacuation 
decision making (Tierney et al., 2001; Canter, 1990; Tong and Canter, 
1985). In such situations, risk communication is one of main factors 
influencing in the decision to evacuate, because usually people take 
action when they know or understand the situation (Lim et al., 2013). 
The process of seeking for information about the risk is called ‘social 
milling’ (Turner and Killian, 1972); it ranges from the time people 
receive the warning to the time they decide to take protective actions 
(Bowser and Cutter, 2015) with people trying to collect information 
about the situation (Drabek, 1999), personal belongings, (D’Orazio and 
Bernardini, 2014) and observing how other people in the proximity 
behave (Kinateder et al., 2018; Abdulkareem et al., 2012). This process 
is pivotal in evacuation: the safety of a person, in fact, depends on the 
possibility to successfully abandon a dangerous area in the most rapid 
and secure way (Casareale et al., 2017). According to Eiser and col-
leagues (Eiser et al., 2012), milling happens not because people are 
‘irrational’, but because of the uncertainty existing in a novel situation in 
terms of the risks and the options open to them; these constraints must 
be investigated, analysed and considered in any development of plans 
for disaster prevention and risk mitigation. 
Despite the fact that anti-social and irrational behaviours (e.g., 
panic) are often assumed to be the most common response to danger and 
disasters (Chertkoff and Kushigian, 1999; Aguirre et al., 1995; Quar-
antelli, 2001, 2008), people in emergency and disaster situations typi-
cally respond in an adaptive manner (Helsloot and Ruitenberg, 2004; 
Aguirre, 2005; Drabek and McEntire, 2003; Der Heide, 2004; Perry and 
Lindell, 2003) and in a way that is both orderly and meaningful in the 
situation. As reported in many studies, people experience fear and un-
certainty, but this does not necessarily mean that they will act selfishly 
or impulsively (Quarantelli, 2008, 1986; Alexander, 2013; Lowe and 
Fothergill, 2003). After moments of uncertainty and milling, in fact, 
people often start to evacuate in a self-organised and coordinated 
(Connell, 2001) manner, usually acting as a group, especially in the 
presence of familiar people (Riad et al., 1999; Drury et al., 2009). This 
happens because people act in groups, with familiar persons and rela-
tives, unknown people or both in normal circumstances and in the ma-
jority of routine situations. Such groups are maintained also in 
emergencies, by seeking the proximity of familiar people, or to create a 
new relationship with strangers. Shared identity, in terms of sharing a 
sense of ‘we-ness’ with others affected, enhances the expression of social 
behaviours and solidarity (Drury et al., 2009). Overall, during disasters 
collaborative behaviours are more common than competitive behav-
iours (Helsloot and Ruitenberg, 2004; Drury et al., 2009). 
The literature suggests that competing instructions may only result in 
confusing people during their decision-making process in the event of an 
evacuation (Ploran et al., 2018) and that uncertainty often leads people 
to depend on others to provide information (Eiser et al., 2012). This led 
to what is known in sociology as “normalcy bias” (Omer and Alon, 
1994). During the Costa Concordia disaster, in fact, many passengers 
received conflicting instructions and reinsuring information from the 
staff trying to avoid panic and maladaptive behaviours, (Court of 
Grosseto, 2015) while the literature suggests that usually the result is 
exactly the opposite (Quarantelli, 2008). This affected the passengers’ 
assessment of the emergency and the underestimation of the situation 
probably lead to more deaths and injuries. 
By that time the ship was listing heavily and the use of all the life-
boats on the ship was impossible. Some of the passengers had already 
left the ship and others on the deck were waiting to leave on one of the 
remaining boats. The Costa Concordia disaster could easily have 
involved massive loss of life (Alexander, 2012). While listing and 
turning the ship could have slid into deep water. As reported, fortu-
nately, not all the passengers heeded the order to return to cabins, and 
people who did were at risk of entrapment and drowning. Unfortunately, 
most of the people who died did so because of a lack of information. 
Evacuation behaviour in cruises can be similar to evacuation 
behaviour in buildings (Casareale et al., 2017); in both environments, 
emergencies and crisis can generate factors that could trigger create 
competitive behaviours (Fahy et al., 2012). When representing emer-
gency behaviour, the mass media, some people involved in the emer-
gency, and sometimes also experts often use the term “panic” to describe 
people’s emotion and actions (Fahy et al., 2012). Many authors agree on 
the definition of specific general key conditions under which collective 
panic can occur (Perry and Lindell, 2003; Gantt and Gantt, 2012; Fritz 
and Marks, 1954) but, despite this attempt to find common features, the 
literature still does not provide an agreed meaning for the concept of 
panic. More importantly, it cannot easily be determined whether 
behaviour is rational or irrational in a situation like an emergency (how 
should people behave?) (Erlingsson and Brysiewicz, 2017) Rather than 
speculating on rational (vs irrational) motivations, It makes more sense 
to examine people’s reactions to dangerous or emergency situations in 
terms of competitive behaviours - which may or may not be linked to 
feelings such as fear, anxiety and terror – versus cooperative behaviours 
(Drury et al., 2009). 
As usually happens when a disaster strikes, several media source 
reported “panic” during the emergency of the Costa Concordia 
(Kvamme, 2017). However, the media often report a distorted and 
oversimplified description of people’s reactions during disasters (Zarqa, 
2013). Some research articles highlighted episodes of competitive 
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behaviour and chaotic reactions during the evacuation of the Costa 
Concordia, that were only transient (Alexander, 2012), but in addition 
to leadership issues, strongly affected the result of the evacuation 
(Kvamme, 2017). The majority of those studies are based on limited 
secondary collections of unofficial documents, such as photographs, 
video sequences, reports by media, post hoc interviews with survivors 
and scientific reconstructions; examples are the reconstruction of the 
sequence of events before, during and immediately after the event 
(Alexander, 2012), the identification of behaviours among the evacuees 
that may have contributed in reducing the effectiveness of the evacua-
tion procedures (Kvamme, 2017) and the discussion of the circum-
stances of the accident, the problems encountered during the evacuation 
and the search and rescue (Elnabawybahriz et al., 2016). These studies 
may be biased from the necessity of “selling” a story and make it 
appealing (Kvamme, 2017). Therefore, as suggested by Kvamme (2017), 
the use of the transcripts of passengers’ statements from the court pro-
ceedings would add consistent value to the analysis of human behaviour 
in the Costa Concordia disaster and widen the understanding of how 
people behave during maritime disasters. 
2. Materials and methods 
This research is based on secondary data collection and provides 
critical analysis of documents related to the Costa Concordia disaster 
proceedings that have been released only recently. In detail, the docu-
ments refer to the passengers’ witness statements registered during the 
hearings held by the Court of Grosseto that started soon after the acci-
dent occurred (from February 2012 to December 2014). Proceedings 
were collected in compliance with criminal procedural law. Documents 
were disclosed only after the issuance of the Judgment of the Court of 
First Instance of 11 February 2015 no. 115/2015 which sentenced the 
captain of the Costa Concordia to 16 years in prison. Then, the Court of 
Grosseto ruling was upheld by the Italian Supreme Court (ruling no. 
35585/2017 issued on July 19, 2017). All the passengers’ witness 
statements were in Italian and already officially translated by the court’s 
offices using professional and registered translators. 
A total of 49 passengers’ statements were collected: of those, the 
majority were females (52%) while passengers were Italians in 93% of 
the cases. The whole set of statements has been edited and collated in a 
single document resulting in a total of 19,271 words. In order to assess 
how and whether the lack of management by the crew affected the 
passengers’ behaviour, we performed a mixed method content analysis 
to identify patterns in the passengers’ witness evidence. The mixed 
method analysis has been chosen for the advantage of being able to 
account for both narratives and standardized data (Gambrel and Butler 
Vi, 2013). All the documents collected were analysed, and passengers’ 
witness evidence was extracted. The contents related to the passengers’ 
behaviour once landed and information about the compensation were 
removed. The final analysis was read and re-read to get a sense of the 
whole and to gain a general understanding of the content of the in-
structions (Erlingsson and Brysiewicz, 2017). 
A qualitative analysis (i.e. coding) was performed in order to find 
patterns of behaviour and have a preliminary idea of whether compe-
tition was a predominant behaviour during the emergency or whether 
cooperation prevailed. Since the aim of the study is to find practical and 
useful insights to describe how people behave during an emergency 
when management is not fully ensured, we analysed the documents from 
a pragmatic perspective. Using a mixed method, we aimed at empha-
sizing the nature of people’s experience and how experience and shared 
beliefs influenced choices and the outcomes of their actions (Patton, 
2015). All the relevant documents found in the literature review were 
read, analysed and reviewed by the authors to extract content on what to 
do in relation to a disaster. A special focus was given to the phases of the 
disaster and on the behaviour of people in relation to other people or 
themselves. In order to keep their anonymity, passengers have been 
alphabetically ordered and they have been attributed a number 
according to the alphabetical order (e.g. Passenger 1 is the first pas-
senger that appears in the list, while Passenger 49 is the last one). 
The document then was imported into Nvivo 12® and an exploratory 
and descriptive analysis was carried out. A word frequency search was 
used as preliminary analysis to identify and list the most frequently 
occurring words and to identify possible patterns. Then, a text search 
was performed to search for the specific words or phrases coming from 
the word frequency research and from the design of the study; their use 
in the text was explored to identify possible networks and finally words 
or phrases were automatically coded. 
All the evidence collected from the Court of Grosseto was read, 
analysed and reviewed by the authors to extract content about behav-
iours related to the behaviour of people in relation to other people or 
themselves. All the sets of evidence in the proceedings were transformed 
into Condensed Meaning Units (CMU). Condensation is the process of 
shortening the text while still preserving the core meaning to ensure that 
the core meaning is still retained. All the CMUs were labelled by 
formulating codes and then grouping these codes into categories and 
themes. 
The coding process followed the phases indicated by Erlingsson and 
Brysiewicz (2017). A protocol for content-analysing behaviour, con-
sisting of a codebook and a coding form, was developed in order to make 
the set of codes so complete and unambiguous as to almost eliminate the 
individual differences among coders (Neuendorf, 2017). A mixed cod-
ing, both inductive and deductive (Rivas, 2012), was used in which some 
codes were known prior to analysis and some of the codes emerged 
during the reading of the text. A set of five categories (themes), 
conceptualized as patterns of shared meaning across data that are united 
by a central concept (Braun and Clarke, 2012), have been used. 
The first theme was used to define the demographic characteristics of 
the passengers and to capture the range of variation among person 
profiles; the respondents were coded by gender (male vs. female) and 
nationality (Italian vs. foreigners). Nationality was used to understand 
the issue of language and if there has been a different reaction based on 
the understanding of the message (most of the messages were in Italian). 
The second theme labelled as “perception” contains all the passengers’ 
descriptions related to feelings, perceptions, and whether people were 
afraid. The third theme represents the types of actions described by 
passengers in terms of behaviours categorized as: a) behaviours of giving 
or receiving information; b) behaviour of giving or receiving help; c) 
imitative behaviour of others; d) competitive behaviour; e) lack of in-
formation, instructions or help; f) no reaction; g) opposite behaviour or 
thought to instruction or information received; and h) “general behav-
iour”. The code “general behaviour” was assigned to all the actions that 
did not refer to the above specific categories as suggested in the litera-
ture (Neuendorf, 2017), such as moving from a place to another or 
collecting lifejackets. The fourth theme was used to code all the 
behaviour based on the person who made/received a specific behaviour. 
The main nodes were: a) actions towards the passenger him/herself; b) 
actions towards people belonging to the family nucleus (e.g. wife, hus-
bands, children, etc.) and familiar people (e.g. friends); c) other people 
or unknown people with who the passenger has no contact or relation-
ship prior to the emergency; and d) Costa Concordia crew members. 
Finally, behaviours were coded according to the location where the 
action took place to find out any relation between the description of 
different types of behaviour (i.e. cooperative vs competitive) and the 
location of passengers. 
A further inductive stage was completed in which the researchers 
added additional codes based on reading the initial transcripts and 
identifying unexpected issues and topics that had emerged during data 
collection. The final code frame consisted of 19 codes located across 5 
main thematic or interest areas. Table 2 outlines the codebook and 
presents the list of the codes and themes, with description and examples, 
used in the coding process. 
To ensure the quality and the reliability of the data coding, an Inter- 
Coder Reliability (ICR) test using Cohen’s κ was performed. The test 
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allows to estimate the agreement between coders accounting for their 
chance agreement (MacPhail et al., 2016) and to evaluate the extent to 
which these coders make similar coding decisions in assessing the 
characteristics of text (Lombard et al., 2004) in terms of behaviours. A 
random sample consisting of the 10% (five out of 49) of the total 
statements (Lombard et al., 2004) was extracted and coded indepen-
dently for the κ by the principal investigator and by an external second 
coder who was invited to code the sample. The second external coder, a 
student form Università Politecnica delle Marche with experience in 
coding research, underwent a training process consisting of revising the 
codebook (that contains the definition of the nodes) to get comfortable 
with the coding scheme (Neuendorf, 2017). Blind coding, in which 
coders do not know the aim of the research (Knobloch, 2008), was used 
in order to reduce bias that compromise validity. A criterion of 0.80 or 
greater for Cohen’s kappa was selected based on the literature in-
dications (Lombard et al., 2004). There was excellent agreement be-
tween the two coders, with κ = 0.826 (p < .001). 
In order to assess how and whether passengers behaved, both in 
relation to familiar persons or strangers, we performed a mixed method 
content analysis to identify core consistency and patterns in the pas-
sengers’ witness evidence. Results were then analysed in order to 
explore the relationship between the codes. In order to explore and show 
data relationships and patterns we used Nvivo software’s matrix coding/ 
crosstab function that provides matrices and show the relationship be-
tween different groups of codes within the set of instructions. The re-
lationships described by matrices are mainly focused on which 
behaviours (coded based on the behaviour) are related to different ty-
pology of people. Combinations of codes are presented in tables that 
provide frequencies expressed as numbers of key categories (Neuendorf, 
2017; Krippendorff, 2004). 
3. Results 
Passengers reported fear, confusion, ‘panic’ and competitive behav-
iour, as well as cooperation. They also reported communication issues 
and lack of trust in the authorities. Starting from the word count anal-
ysis, specific words in the text were searched. Table 3 presents the count 
of the main words used in the whole document. The word “panico” 
(panic) with stemmed words, is present in the text 34 times, representing 
0.18% of the whole document, 40 times before (0.21%), two times 
during (0.01%) and eight times after (0.04%). 
The 21 codes used in the coding analysis produced 1148 references 
(number of times when an instruction has been coded): 467 references 
were found using the theme “people”, 503 using the theme “behaviour”, 
50 using the theme feeling, and 30 using the theme “location”. The 
remaining nodes were for “gender” (49) and “nationality” (49) 
(Table 4). 
According to the count of codes by person: a) 17 (35%) passengers 
said they provided help to someone; b) 21 (43%) passengers said that 
they received help; c) 25 (51%) passengers reported competing behav-
iours and 29 (59%) said they behaved in a different way to what they 
have been told by the crew members; d) 41 (84%) passengers received 
information from others; e) 8 (16%) passengers followed other passen-
gers; and f) 36 (73%) passengers reported a lack of information by the 
crew members. 
The Nvivo Crosstab function provided a set of 3 relational matrices 
(contingency tables) for analysis: a behaviour-by-person 4 × 7 matrix, a 
panic behaviour-by-location 2 × 3 matrix and an opposite behaviour-by- 
instructions from the crew 3 × 2 matrix. The first matrix describes the 
relation between the behaviour described and the person with whom the 
passenger made such behaviour. This matrix is used to analyse if the 
behaviour of passengers was with familiar people, strangers or in-
dividuals. The second matrix is used to define the location of passengers 
when they describe competitive behaviour such as pushing, trampling 
and trying to board the safety boat without helping others. The last 
matrix is used to investigate the relation between the instruction from 
the crew and the decision the passenger has taken (follow vs not to 
follow). The variables are all a similar kind or type (case nodes v case 
nodes). 
The descriptive analysis shows that: a) 23 (65.7%) of codes refer to 
help given to a familiar person; b) 17 (44.7%) of codes refer to people 
who received help from stranger; c) there was no difference between 
codes that describe receiving information from familiar or others; d) 
nine (64.3%) of the codes about following behaviours refers to strangers 
and three (21.4%) to familiar people, e) 54 (54.5%) of general behav-
iours codes refer to familiar people, 25 (25.3%) to others. Results are 
summarised in Table 5 and Fig. 1. 
Table 2 
List of the codes and themes, with description and examples, used in the coding 
process.  
CODE DESCRIPTION THEME 
Gender Male/Female Demographic 
Nationality Italian/foreigner 
Feeling and perception 
of the risk 
Passengers describe feelings, risk 
perception, and report people afraid. 
There is no mention to real behaviour 
involved 
Perception 
Give info or 
instructions to 
Action of giving information or 
instructions to someone 
Type of 
action 
Receive info or 
instructions from 
Action of receiving information or 
instructions from someone 
Give help to Action of helping or providing support 
to someone 
Receive help from Action of receiving help or support from 
someone 
Follow who The act of follow/repeat the behaviour 
of other people  
Competitive behaviour Competitive behaviour (e.g. pushing, 
screaming, running, trying to get 
onboard without helping people).  
Lack of information or 
instructions or help 
Lack of information on what to do, 
where to go, how to behave. 
No reaction Lack of reaction or no action during the 
emergency 
Opposite behaviour or 
thought 
Opposite action as results of an official 
instructions that is perceived as 
incorrect or not useful 
General behaviour 
with 
Any kind of action not coded in the other 
codes (e.g. moving from a place to 
another, collecting lifejackets) 
performed with someone 
Himself or alone The behaviour/interaction is linked to 
the passenger himself 
People 
Familiar people The behaviour/interaction is linked to 
familiar people (family members, 
friends, people already known before 
the emergency happened) 
Other people The behaviour/interaction is linked to 
unfamiliar people (people meet or 
known during the emergency) 
Crew and staff The behaviour/interaction is linked to 
with the crew (costa Concordia crew, 
waiters, kitchen staff) 
Close to the safety boat Behaviour in the proximity of the safety 
boat 
Location 
Inside the ship Any other location not coded in the 
other codes  
Table 3 
Count and weighted percentage of social words.  
WORD (ITA) WORD (ENG) REFERENCE COVERAGE 
Panico Panic 34 0,18 
Famiglia Family 11 0,08 
Marito Husband 32 0,17 
Moglie Wife 47 0,25 
Figlio Son 12 0,06 
Paura Fear 12 0,05 
Cosa fare What to do 68 0,24  
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In total 59 descriptions of behaviours related to competitive behav-
iours were found deriving from the competitive behaviour-by-location 2 
× 3 matrix; of these 17 (13%) are inside the ship, 41 (56%) are related to 
a location in proximity of the safety boats and 1 (3%) to behaviour inside 
the safety boat. The following behaviours were grouped under “coop-
erative behaviours” to make a comparison with competitive behaviours: 
a) give info or instructions to; b) receive information/instruction from; 
c) give help to; d) receive help from; and e) follow who. 
There was a significant association between the behaviour and the 
location of the passenger (χ2 = 45.7, p < .001). This result is consistent 
with the odds ratio, which shows that the odds of having competitive 
behaviour were 9.4 times higher in the proximity of the safety boats than 
inside the ship (Table 6). 
Most of those behaviours called ‘panic’ refer to the description of 
other people’s behaviours (80%) rather than familiar people (9%) or 
staff (11%). No one described his own behaviour as ‘panicking’, similar 
to previous findings in the literature (Fahy et al., 2012). 
Almost everyone in the sample claimed that they received little in-
formation or didn’t receive information at all from staff; in total 58 
nodes related to instructions from crew and of these 47 (82%) resulted in 
opposite behaviours, 9 (15%) in general behaviour and 2 (3%) to a 
following behaviour (Table 7). 
4. Discussion 
The evacuation during the Costa Concordia disaster was very chal-
lenging. The delay in declaring the alarm and the consequent late issue 
of the evacuation order, in fact, resulted in a less quick and effective 
abandonment of the ship. Furthermore, the abandonment by the captain 
before the end of the process resulted in a lack of management with the 
staff members who had to rely instead on organizational improvisation 
and their experience and knowledge rather than specific procedures to 
Table 4 
Count of the main nodes used for the analysis.  
THEME CODE LABEL N OF REFERENCES 
People Crew and staff 202 
Familiar people 108 
Other people 127 
Himself or alone 30 
Behaviour Follow who 14 
General behaviour with 99 
Give help to 35 
Give information or instructions to 10 
Lack of information or instructions or help 92 
No reaction 4 
Opposite behaviour or thought 53 
Competitive behaviour 46 
Receive help from 38 
Receive info or instructions from 112  
Feeling and perception of the risk 50 
Gender Female 23 
Male 26 
Nationality Italian 43 
Foreigner 6 
Location Inside the ship 7 
Close to the safety boat 23  
Table 5 
Results of the behaviour-by-person 7 × 4 matrix.   
GIVE INFO OR 
INSTRUCTIONS TO (N 
= 10) 
RECEIVE INFO OR 
INSTRUCTIONS FROM (N 
= 112) 
GIVE HELP 
TO (N = 35) 
RECEIVE HELP 




NO INFO OR 
INSTRUCTIONS OR HELP 
FROM (N = 92) 
GENERAL 
BEHAVIOUR WITH 
(N = 99) 
Crew 2 (20%) 90 (80.4%) 0 14 (36.8%) 2 (14.3%) 88 (95.7%) 9 (9.1%) 
Familiar 
people 
4 (40%) 8 (7.1%) 23 (65.7%) 7 (18.4%) 3 (21.4%) 0 54 (54.5%) 
Himself or 
alone 
0 2 (1.8%) 1 (2.9%) 0 0 1 (1%) 11 (11.1%) 


























Passengers' cooperative behaviour 
Crew Familiar people Himself or alone Other people
Fig. 1. Percentages of behaviour-by-person 7x4 matrix.  
Table 6 
Analysis of competitive and cooperative behaviour vs. location.  
BEHAVIOUR INSIDE SHIP 
(N = 96) 
PROXIMITY OF 






Competitive 29 (30.2%) 69 (80.2%) 9.4 
(4.7–18.6) 
<.001 
Cooperative 67 (69.8%) 17 (19.8%) 1  
Table 7 
Opposite behaviour-by-instructions from the crew 3 × 2 matrix.  
BEHAVIOUR INSTRUCTIONS FROM CREW 
Opposite behaviour or thought 47 
General behaviour with 9 
Follow others 2  
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manage the situation. Such lack of management and the inability of the 
crew to effectively manage the emergency (they also faced the same 
uncertainties of passengers) had important consequences for people’s 
behaviour: according to official documents, after the captain abandoned 
the ship, passengers realised that the emergency was not just a blackout 
and quickly lost trust in authorities’ instructions and communications 
that resulted in spontaneous organisation and behaviours. 
The results of this analysis highlight the challenges that passengers 
experienced in accessing, processing and applying information to make 
decisions. The qualitative analysis of the passengers’ statements sug-
gests that during the emergency people exhibited different behaviours 
during different phases of the evacuation. Although it is not possible to 
make a clear distinction between what happened before the evacuation 
signals were given, the evidence provides a description of the general 
trend of the behaviours during the emergency. Passengers described a 
first phase of disbelief and describe feelings of fear and confusion 
relating to the moments immediately following the impact. 
These results are in line with the results of previous studies 
(Kvamme, 2017; Alexander, 2012) which conclude that the emergency 
of the Costa Concordia was mainly characterised by cooperative 
behaviour and competition occurred only seldomly. A substantial 
element that emerges from this qualitative analysis and that adds 
meaning to the results already achieved with previous research is the 
suggestion that competitive behaviour occurred in correspondence with 
the specific situation with the lifeboats. Summarising the qualitative 
results, most people described cooperative behaviour, even between 
people with no bonds before the emergency. Almost all the passengers 
declared that they didn’t receive any information or support from the 
crew; furthermore, when they realised that the emergency was more 
severe than described by the crew, they decided to behave spontane-
ously against crew instructions. Passengers witnessed episodes of 
behaviour they described as ‘panic’ mainly in the proximity of the safety 
boats and as a behaviour of others, including the staff. These statements 
are confirmed by the results of the quantitative analysis, as reported 
below and confirmed existing studies about competitive behaviours 
(Chertkoff and Kushigian, 1999). 
There is almost no evidence of difference between familiar people 
(family and friends) and strangers when referring to helping people 
during the emergency. This result is in line with the social identity 
approach that describes that during emergencies people affected by the 
incident often come to see themselves as a group through common fate 
and behave as a group instead of being selfish (Drury, 2018). 
The quantitative analysis also showed that lots of passengers referred 
to lack of support in terms of information, management, evacuation 
instructions and especially to a critical management of the boarding of 
the lifeboats that was one of the most crucial phases in the evacuation. 
The lack of help, information or support, especially from the staff 
resulted in spontaneous behaviours and decisions in order to deal with a 
situation characterised by uncertainty, or even they helped the staff to 
evacuate people and manoeuvre the lifeboats. The decision to delay the 
evacuation and reassure the passengers that nothing was happening, in 
fact, produced a series of instructions and orders that were not followed 
by the people, who preferred to act following their own perception of the 
ongoing situation. The decision to delay the issue of the evacuation 
order resulted in conflicting information to the passengers who soon 
realised that something was happening and stopped trusting the au-
thorities. Such condition was pivotal in influencing the behaviour of 
passengers. Most of the people who received information from the crew 
behaved in the opposite way when they realised that the situation was 
different. The management in relation to the information was very poor 
and giving incomplete information to passengers even when the situa-
tion was already clearly assessed resulted in the opposite outcome. Such 
a condition is commonly reported in literature when people loses trust in 
the authorities (Eiser et al., 2012; Burningham et al., 2008; Scolobig 
et al., 2015; Eriksen and Prior, 2011), as happened on the Costa 
Concordia. 
The analysis of the passengers’ witness statements showed that 
during the emergency people largely behaved in a very cooperative way, 
even though ‘panic’ was the word used most by passengers; what people 
described with ‘panic’, as confirmed by the literature, were mostly fear 
and anxiety. However, many of them reported scenes of crushing, and 
behaviours of pushing and running in proximity to the lifeboats. People 
who could not access the lifeboat tried to find another way of escaping: 
of the 32 victims, 7 tried to escape jumping on the sea while the rest 
decided or were instructed to move on the other side of the ship to find 
another safety boat. Passengers never refer to themselves when 
describing panic, and this is consistent the literature that says that panic 
is often reported when people observe the behaviour of others (Fritz and 
Marks, 1954), if it leads to an unsuccessful outcome (Kvamme, 2017). 
The term is also widely misused when people describe their own state of 
intensified anxiety or fear, although the actions they report taking 
themselves are typically both reasonable for the situation and appro-
priate (Fahy and Proulx, 2009). This also supports the theory that people 
often overestimate the extremity of an emotion in a crowd (Goldenberg 
et al., 2020). While it is not useful to say that collective panic happened 
during the event, since people usually refer to panic to describe fear and 
chaos, it is possible to say that competitive behaviour was present only 
during the boarding of the lifeboats. While on the ship and far from the 
safety boats, people were able to obtain, exchange and process infor-
mation to find the best way to reach the safety boats. When in proximity 
of the gates on the muster stations, people pictured the real situation in 
their minds: not all the safety boats could be used because of the rota-
tion, therefore seats on the boats were limited. This is a step forward in 
the analysis of the evacuation of the Costa Concordia because it confirms 
findings about evacuation behaviour on the Costa Concordia of other 
studies (Kvamme, 2017; Alexander, 2012), but this analysis is able to 
exactly define precisely where competition happened. 
As already explained in the introduction, evacuation behaviour on 
cruise ships can be compared to that in buildings (Casareale et al., 2017) 
and the same conditions that trigger competitive behaviour can be 
applied (Chertkoff and Kushigian, 1999): the perception of the danger, 
the short number of boats (lack of exits), the feeling that the boats were 
running out (and exit not available anymore) could have triggered 
competitive behaviour in the proximity of lifeboats and explain why 
competition did not happen in other places throughout the emergency. 
These results reinforce the idea that is not useful to talk about “panic” 
when addressing to peoples’ behaviour during an event, as previous 
studies did when analysing the Costa Concordia disaster (Alexander, 
2012) but it is preferable to talk about competitive behaviours, which 
can be measured and compared with cooperative behaviours. Moreover, 
such behaviours need to be contextualised and every situation referred 
to the environmental conditions. 
The deficiencies in command on the Costa Concordia highlight the 
need to introduce new protocols ideated to increase the skills of the 
personnel called to manage an emergency at sea. Such protocols should 
be tested with ad hoc training programs that consider also unexpected 
scenarios (as a captain leaving his/her ship). The objectives to be ach-
ieved in order to allow the staff responsible for managing passengers 
during an emergency to obtain the relevant certifications must be 
expanded. In addition, those responsible for preparing communities and 
organizations for disasters should also plan for improvisation to occur. 
This study has some limitations. Firstly, the data presented and 
analysed in this paper come from secondary sources; all the passengers’ 
witness evidence have been collected during the hearings held by the 
Court of Grosseto by lawyers of the Grosseto court. The authors 
requested direct contact with the passengers contacting their lawyers, 
but this was denied, and questions were not allowed. The legal and 
official nature of the evidence excludes the types of bias that can be 
found in the media, which tends to exaggerate the story; and due to the 
fact of people responding under oath, all the answers could be consid-
ered authentic. Secondly, only 49 statements were analysed of the total 
of 3216 passengers. In order to ensure solid credibility (Bengtsson, 
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2016) of the content analysis, it would have been useful to analyse the 
totality of the survived passengers’ statement; however, those collected 
are the only statements available and made public by the court; there-
fore a deeper analysis of passengers’ behaviour cannot be performed. 
The design also has some strengths. Passengers’ statements about 
competitive and cooperative behaviours were not made to the prompts 
of researchers’ interview questions and therefore can be considered 
relatively naturalistic. 
5. Conclusion 
The number of maritime accidents and disasters is growing and, 
despite the increasing body of regulation and codes, there is a only a 
small body of scientific literature on maritime disasters, discussing 
emergency management and factors that affect (enhance/reduce) the 
success of the evacuation and safety procedures; in particular, specific 
human factors, in terms of human error in management and emergent 
behaviours, are still not deeply investigated and considered in the cre-
ation of guidelines and rules to improve the management of future 
disasters. 
This paper highlighted that the main factor in reducing the effec-
tiveness of the evacuation procedure was the lack of management rather 
than the behaviours among evacuees. Spontaneous and cooperative 
behaviour, both among evacuees and the staff, helped people to adapt to 
the event and possibly contributed to reduce the number of casualties. 
On the contrary, competitive behaviours happened but only in relation 
to specific environmental constraints and limited to the proximity of 
lifeboats, where people described others crushing and pushing. 
Even if regulations and laws define the captain as the main authority 
on the ship and requires him/her to manage emergencies, situations in 
which the captain did not perform his role can happen and have 
happened in the past. When such unexpected and unplanned events and 
contingencies arise, the management of the emergency is often based on 
organizational improvisation and on the capacity of the people to find a 
solution by themselves that sometimes, as shown in this paper, strongly 
affect the effectiveness of the procedures. Therefore, a decision support 
system (DSS) for the crew could be defined, to accurately predict the 
procedures to be implemented in the absence of the command figure, to 
ensure the information exchange among crew members and between the 
crew and passengers. Understanding how people deal with a situation 
and which are the factors that affect their decision is pivotal to increase 
the effectiveness and the efficacy of future plans and regulations. This 
could help planners to review their strategy, anticipate similar events 
and consider all the factors. 
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Appendix A. List of the behaviours described by passengers 
The single behaviour category is indicated in the first column, the second column reports the original comment of the passenger, while the 
translation of passengers’ comment is reported in the third column.   
BEHAVIOUR QUOTATION (ITALIAN) QUOTATION (ENGLISH) 
Fear “[…] ho visto che stava salendo l’acqua, quindi mi sono spaventata”. 
(Passeggero 1, 12 maggio 2014) 
“[…] I saw that the water was rising, so I got scared”. (Passenger 1, May 12, 
2014) 
“Erano circa le nove e un quarto quando abbiamo avvertito un forte boato, 
inizialmente siamo rimasti fermi, poi la gente ha iniziato a gridare ed 
accalcarsi verso l’uscita, così anche noi, spaventati, ci siamo avviati in quella 
direzione”. (Passeggero 16, 13 maggio 2014) 
“It was about a quarter past nine when we heard a loud roar, initially we stood 
still, then people started shouting and huddling towards the exit, so we too, 
frightened, moved in that direction”. (Passenger 16, May 13, 2014) 
“Ho sempre avuto paura che la nave si inclinasse a tal punto da ribaltarsi. 
Questa era la mia preoccupazione più grande, perché sarei finito sotto la 
nave”. (Passeggero 21, 29 aprile 2014). 
“I’ve always been afraid that the ship would tilt so much that it would tip 
over. This was my biggest concern, because I would have ended up under the 
ship” (Passenger 21, April 29, 2014). 
Confusion “[…] siamo scesi dalla scala interna sino al ponte 4 dove vi era la confusione 
totale”. (Passeggero 13, 7 ottobre 2014) 
“[…] we went down the internal staircase to deck 4 where there was total 
confusion”. (Passenger 13, October 7, 2014) 
“Usciti di nostra iniziativa dal teatro abbiamo trovato panico e confusione”. 
(Passeggero 27, 20 maggio 2014) 
“We left the theatre on our own initiative and we found panic and confusion”. 
(Passenger 27, May 20, 2014) 
Panic “[…] subito si è creato il panico anche perché nessuno ci ha fornito 
informazioni”. (Passeggero 3, 7 ottobre 2014) 
“[…] panic immediately arose also because nobody gave us information”. 
(Passenger 3, October 7, 2014) 
“[…] abbiamo notato persone nel panico, qualcuno correva, qualcuno era a 
terra”. (Passeggero 13, 7 ottobre 2014) 
“[…] we noticed people in panic, someone was running, someone was on the 
ground”. (Passenger 13, October 7, 2014) 
“[…] ho cercato di calmare mia moglie che era nel panico, ricordo di averla 
addirittura presa a schiaffi”. (Passeggero 16, 13 maggio 2014) 
“[…] I tried to calm my wife who was panicking, I remember even slapping 
her”. (Passenger 16, May 13, 2014) 
(continued on next page) 
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(continued ) 
BEHAVIOUR QUOTATION (ITALIAN) QUOTATION (ENGLISH) 
“[…] c’era molta fila la gente spingeva e c’erano persone nel panico, ricordo 
che una ragazza per riuscire a salire [sulla scialuppa] si è seduta sulla mia 
spalla”. (Passeggero 18, 6 ottobre 2014) 
“[…] there were a lot of people pushing and there were people in panic, I 
remember that a girl sat on my shoulder to be able to get on [the lifeboat]”. 
(Passenger 18, October 6, 2014) 
“La gente oramai era in preda al panico, spingevano per poter entrare nelle 
scialuppe e l’inclinazione aumentava ad ogni minuto, io e mia moglie 
proteggevamo con i nostri corpi i bambini e i miei genitori dalle persone che si 
muovevano alla ricerca di una scialuppa”. (Passeggero 26, 29 aprile 2014) 
“People were now panicking, they pushed to be able to enter the lifeboats and 
the inclination increased every minute, my wife and I protected with our 
bodies our children and my parents from people who moved in search of a 
lifeboat”. (Passenger 26, April 29, 2014) 
“Nella mia posizione, aggrappato al passamano del corridoio, cercavo di 
proteggermi dalle persone che in preda al panico cercava[no] di aggrapparsi a 
tutto ciò che poteva compreso a me”. (Passeggero 16, 13 maggio 2014) 
“In my position, clinging to the handrail in the corridor, I tried to protect 
myself from people who in panic tried to cling to everything that could 
including me”. (Passenger 16, 13 May 2014) 
“Tutti, soprattutto gli addetti ai lavori, sono andati in panico”. (Passeggero 42, 
13 maggio 2014) 
“Everyone, especially the personnel responsible for the evacuation, 
panicked”. (Passenger 42, 13 May 2014) 
Competitive 
behaviour 
“Le persone hanno iniziato ad accapigliarsi, io mi sono dovuta reggere ad un 
palo tenendo stretta la bambina per non venire travolta, un addetto si è 
rifiutato di farci salire perché diceva che non aveva l’autorizzazione allora noi 
siamo come impazziti e lo abbiamo costretto a farci salire”. (Passeggero 4, 13 
maggio 2014). 
“People started to fight, I had to hold on to a pole holding the little girl tight so 
as not to be overwhelmed, an employee refused to let us go up because he said 
he had no authorization; then we got crazy and we forced him to make us go 
up”. (Passenger 4, 13 May 2014). 
“Sono arrivati due membri dell’equipaggio ed hanno afferrato delle persone 
tirandole fuori [dalla scialuppa], la gente continuava a gettarsi dentro e la 
scialuppa non è stata completamente sbracciata nonostante due persone 
aiutassero spingendo dal ponte”. (Passeggero 4, 13 maggio 2014). 
“Two crew members arrived and grabbed people by pulling them out [the 
lifeboat], people kept throwing themselves in, and the lifeboat was not fully 
hugged despite two people helping by pushing from the bridge”. (Passenger 4, 
13 May 2014). 
“A quel punto io ho chiesto all’ufficiale come potevamo salvarci e lui mi ha 
risposto che aveva moglie e figli e ci ha lasciato lì”. (Passeggero 15, 26 maggio 
2014) 
“At that point I asked the officer how we could save ourselves and he replied 
that he had a wife and children and left us there”. (Passenger 15, May 26, 
2014) 
“Al ponte 4, che abbiamo raggiunto faticosamente impiegando oltre 20 minuti, 
c’era un fiume di gente, tutti spingevano e non si riusciva a fare un passo”. 
(Passeggero 16, 13 maggio 2014) 
“At bridge 4, which we reached with difficulty taking over 20 min, there was a 
river of people, everyone was pushing, and it was not possible to take a step”. 
(Passenger 16, 13 May 2014) 
“Ho notato scene assurde, tipo un ragazzo alto un metro e novanta che era in 
fila davanti a donne e bambini, senza dare loro la precedenza come invece 
avrebbe dovuto”. (Passeggero 34, 21 ottobre 2014) 
“I noticed absurd scenes, such as a boy who was 6 feet tall and stood in front of 
women and children, without giving them priority as he should have done”. 
(Passenger 34, 21 October 2014) 
Distrust in 
leadership 
“[…] la nave incombeva sopra di noi così io ho gridato al manovratore di 
sbrigarsi ed anche lui mi sembrava inesperto, come gli altri, siamo stati infatti 
lasciati a noi stessi per oltre due ore”. (Passeggero 3, 7 ottobre 2014) 
“[…] the ship loomed over us, so I shouted to the operator to hurry and he also 
seemed inexperienced, like the others, in fact, we have been left to ourselves 
for over two hours”. (Passenger 3, 7 October 2014) 
“Continuavano gli ufficiali a dirci di stare tranquilli ma era chiaro che c’erano 
problemi”. (Passeggero 4, 13 maggio 2014). 
“The officers kept telling us to be calm, but it was clear that there were 
problems”. (Passenger 4, 13 May 2014). 
“[…] notavo gli inservienti filippini o comunque stranieri che cercavano di 
sbracciare la lancia ma loro non erano in grado di fare le operazioni, fino a che 
un passeggero ha preso l’iniziativa di rompere la catena che ci impediva la 
discesa”. (Passeggero 7, 12 maggio 2014) 
“[…] I noticed the Filipino or foreign attendants anyway, who were trying to 
reach the lifeboat, but they were unable to do such operations, until a 
passenger took the initiative to break the chain that prevented us from 
descending”. (Passenger 7, 12 May 2014) 
“Una volta sulla scialuppa credevamo fosse finita invece è stato anche peggio. 
Era gestita da dei camerieri, dei filippini, che però non sapevano fare nulla, 
non sapevano chiuderla né metterla a mare, l’hanno sganciata di colpo e siamo 
così caduti in mare, ma anche lì non erano in grado di manovrarla e andavamo 
così verso la nave, sentivamo delle botte e la gente urlava continuamente”. 
(Passeggero 20, 13 maggio 2014) 
“Once on the lifeboat we thought it was over, but it was even worse. It was 
managed by waiters, Filipinos, who, however, did not know how to do 
anything, did not know how to close it or put it overboard, they immediately 
dropped it and we fell into the sea, but even there they were unable to 
manoeuvre it and we were going towards the ship, we heard beating and 
people constantly screaming”. (Passenger 20, 13 May 2014) 
“[…] nel tragitto abbiamo incontrato un cameriere che non sapeva darci 
alcuna indicazione, tant’è che un passeggero lo ha addirittura preso a pugni”. 
(Passeggero 28, 26 maggio 2014) 
“[…] on the way, we met a waiter who could not give us any indication, so 
much so that a passenger even punched him”. (Passenger 28, 26 May 2014) 
“Ci è stato detto che era un guasto elettrico ma io e la mia amica abbiamo 
pensato che non era possibile che fosse solo questo, il personale con la giacca 
rossa, l’unico che abbiamo avvistato, ci invitava a tornare nelle cabine ma noi 
non eravamo convinte perché l’impatto era stato troppo forte, così abbiamo 
deciso di recarci alle lance e questo ci ha salvato la vita”. (Passeggero 25, 12 
maggio 2014) 
“We were told it was an electrical fault but my friend and I thought it was not 
possible that it was just this, the staff in the red jacket, the only one we 
spotted, invited us to go back to the cabins but we were not convinced because 
the impact had been too strong, so we decided to go to the boats and this 
saved our lives”. (Passenger 25, 12 May 2014) 
“Una donna continuava ad invitare noi tutti a tornare alle cabine perché non 
c’era nulla di grave e saremmo ripartiti al più presto ma nessuno di noi le ha 
dato ascolto e siamo rimasti sul ponte”. (Passeggero 41, 6 ottobre 2014) 
“A woman continued to invite us all to return to the cabins because there was 
nothing serious and we would be leaving as soon as possible, but none of us 
listened to her and we stayed on the deck”. (Passenger 41, 6 October 2014) 
Communication “Per tutto il percorso in cui ci siamo trasferiti dal lato sinistro al lato dritto 
siamo rimasti da soli e nessuno ci ha mai prestato assistenza o ci ha fornito 
indicazioni”. (Passeggero 3, 7 ottobre 2014) 
“Along the way we moved from the left side to the straight side we were alone, 
and nobody ever gave us assistance or gave us directions”. (Passenger 3, 7 
October 2014) 
“[…] nessuno ci dava indicazioni, continuavano a dire che si trattava di un 
guasto elettrico ma nessuno ci diceva dove andare” (Passeggero 12, 12 maggio 
2014) 
“[…] nobody gave us indications, they kept saying that it was an electrical 
fault, but nobody told us where to go”. (Passenger 12, 12 May 2014) 
“[…] siamo rimasti ad attendere il nulla, intendo dire che sono trascorsi 
parecchi minuti senza che avessimo disposizioni da parte dell’equipaggio di 
qualsiasi grado. Dopo tanto tempo, non riesco a dare un orario preciso, 
personale dell’equipaggio ci ha indicato di formare una catena umana 
mantenendo le posizioni che avevamo e ci hanno detto di percorrere il 
corridoio di comunicazione tra il lato sinistro e quello destro della nave”. 
(Passeggero 26, 29 aprile 2014) 
“[…] we waited for nothing; I mean that several minutes have passed without 
any instructions from the crew of any degree. After a long time, I am unable to 
give a precise time, staff of the crew indicated to us to form a human chain 
keeping the positions we had and they told us to walk the corridor between 
the left and right sides of the ship”. (Passenger 26, April 29, 2014) 
“Abbiamo avuto difficoltà a relazionarci con il personale, molti infatti, come i 
cabinisti, non parlavano italiano e quindi non era possibile la necessaria 
comunicazione”. (Passeggero 34, 21 ottobre 2014) 
“We had difficulties in relating to the staff, many of them in fact, like the cabin 
crew, did not speak Italian and therefore the necessary communication was 
not possible”. (Passenger 34, 21 October 2014) 
“I camerieri non parlavano italiano. Non ci davano notizie ed a gesti ci 
impedivano di salire sulle lance, facendo il gesto di aspettare”. (Passeggero 35, 
12 maggio 2014) 
“The waiters did not speak Italian. They did not give us news and with 
gestures prevented us from getting on the lifeboats, making the gesture of 
waiting”. (Passenger 35, 12 May 2014) 
(continued on next page) 
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(continued ) 
BEHAVIOUR QUOTATION (ITALIAN) QUOTATION (ENGLISH) 
“Dopo l’impatto ̀e andata via la luce, ci ̀e stato detto che era un blackout, sono 
state date altre indicazioni che tuttavia non abbiamo compreso perché non 
sono state tradotte in lingua inglese”. (Passeggero 37, 26 maggio 2014) 
“After the impact, the light went out, we were told it was a blackout, other 
indications were given which, however, we did not understand because they 
were not translated into English”. (Passenger 37, May 26, 2014) 
Cooperation “[…] io piangevo perché non avevo il giubbotto, il mio fidanzato lo ha chiesto 
a due membri del personale che però non gliel’hanno dato, invece un filippino 
se lo è tolto e me lo ha dato”. (Passeggero 5, 26 maggio 2014) 
“[…] I was crying because I did not have a jacket, my boyfriend asked two 
staff members who did not give it to him, instead a Filipino took it off and 
gave it to me”. (Passenger 5, May 26, 2014)   
“[…] una signora ha dato la precedenza a mia madre e mio fratello ma loro da 
soli non potevano andare, mia moglie allora ha detto a mio figlio di salire ma 
lui non voleva andare da solo, la signora così si è impietosita e ci ha dato la 
precedenza”. (Passeggero 6, 26 maggio 2014) 
“[…] a lady gave priority to my mother and my brother, but they could not go 
alone, my wife then told my son to go up, but he did not want to go alone, the 
lady was so pitied, and she gave us priority”. (Passenger 6, May 26, 2014) 
“Ci siamo avviati verso le scialuppe, è stato molto difficile perché c’era gente 
ovunque, una volta arrivato al mezzo, un inserviente mi ha fatto passare 
perché avevo la bambina in braccio e le persone presenti si sono mostrate 
collaborative”. (Passeggero 9, 13 maggio 2014) 
“We headed towards the lifeboats, it was very difficult because there were 
people everywhere, once I got to the lifeboat, an attendant let me go because I 
had the baby girl in my arms and the people there were collaborative”. 
(Passenger 9, May 13, 2014) 
“Né io né il mio compagno né i due amici che erano con noi sapevamo nuotare, 
allora ho chiesto a un rumeno dell’equipaggio, tale Dan, di accompagnarmi in 
cabina ma lui mi ha detto che era pericoloso e che avrebbe cercato lui dei 
giubbotti, è tornato e me ne ha portali solo due, uno da adulto e uno da 
bambino”. (Passeggero 12, 12 maggio 2014) 
“Neither my partner nor the two friends who were with us knew how to swim, 
so I asked a Romanian crew member, Dan, to walk me to the cabin, but he said 
it was dangerous and that he would look for jackets, he returned and he 
brought me only two jackets, one for an adult and one for a child”. (Passenger 
12, 12 May 2014) 
“Saliti a bordo della scialuppa, tutti e sei, abbiamo atteso circa 20 minuti, 
cercando di fare entrare più persone possibili” (Passeggero 40, 7 febbraio 
2012) 
“Once on the lifeboat, all six of us boarded the lifeboat, we waited about 20 
min, trying to bring in as many people as possible”. (Passenger 40, 7 February 
2012) 
“Quando sono riuscita a salire finalmente su una scialuppa mi sono aggrappata 
ad un ferro perché la scialuppa pendeva tutta da una parte. Alcuni passeggeri 
compresi i miei amici hanno collaborato per farla staccare”. (Passeggero 48, 
26 maggio 2014) 
“When I finally got on a lifeboat, I clung to an iron because the lifeboat hung 
all over to one side. Some passengers including my friends worked together to 
get it off”. (Passenger 48, May 26, 2014)  
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